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Abstract
We consider a setup where agents care about i) taking actions that are close to their
preferences, and ii) coordinating with others. The preferences of agents in the same
group are drawn from the same distribution. Each individual is exogenously matched
with other agents randomly selected from the population. Starting from an environment
where everyone belongs to the same group, we show that introducing agents from a
di¤erent group (whose preferences are uncorrelated with those of each of the incumbents)
generates costs but may also (surprisingly) generate benets in the form of enhanced
coordination.
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1 Introduction
We consider a setup where individual decision making involves a trade-o¤ between adap-
tation and coordination.1 Agents care about i) performing actions that are close to their
preferences, and ii) coordinating with others. In our running example, we consider managers
who decide how to organize and run production within their divisions. This includes deciding
how to assign tasks to workers, which technologies to use, how much emphasis to put on
meeting deadlines, etc.2 Each manager has preferences over the way in which production
should be organized in his division. Di¤erent divisions must interact in order to complete
a project/task. As in Dessein and Santos (2006) and Alonso et al. (2008), we assume that
coordination facilitates production and, as a result, managers are concerned with coordinat-
ing with those divisions with whom they are matched. Although we focus on production, it
is clear that the setup could also be used in other contexts. One is social exchange, as in
Kuran and Sandholm (2008); this is a¤ected by personal preferences on how the exchange
should occur (dress code, etiquette, etc.) and also by the need to coordinate with others.
Another is political activism, as in Dewan and Myatt (2008).3 A crucial feature of our setup
is that managers su¤er from an information problem: their privately observed preferences
are made of two components, a group-specic component and an idiosyncratic component,
but they are unable to distinguish between the two. We may think of managers in the same
group as belonging to the same school of thought (e.g., Quantitative Approach versus Hu-
man Relations Approach) or as having similar expertise, although their precise preferences
also have an individual component. Starting from a homogeneous environment (where all
managers belong to the same group), we consider the e¤ect of introducing in the organization
managers belonging to a di¤erent group, whose preferences are uncorrelated with those of
each of the incumbents.
The model is introduced in section 2. In section 3, we consider the benchmark case
1This trade-o¤ has long been recognized as important, not only within economics but also in other disci-
plines see e.g. March (1991) for an early contribution in the management literature.
2 In this simple example workers are left entirely unmodelled. The way to think about them is as automata
that simply follow their division managers instructions.
3A further illustration is given by a parent who must instil moral values in his child. He faces a a trade-o¤
between the desire to transmit values that reect his personal preferences and the desire to conform to society
at large. E.g., a prudish parent may have a personal preference for instilling a strict moral code in his child,
but he may also have to make concessions if other children are raised more liberally, or else his child risks
being ostracized by other children. Adriani and Sonderegger (2009) present a model of intergenerational
transmission where the coordination concerns of parents arise endogenously.
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where all managers in the organization belong to the same group. The key observation here
is that manager preferences may di¤er, even within the same group, because of the presence
of idiosyncratic shocks. This translates into within-group heterogeneity of behavior.4 Since
the environment is characterized by coordination externalities, we show that, from a central
planners perspective, the equilibrium exhibits too little coordination. This arises because
managers put too much weight on their personal preferences when selecting how to organize
production in their division.
In section 4, we characterize what happens when some of the rms divisions are assigned
to managers belonging to another group. The presence of managers of another group has
two e¤ects. First, incumbent managers move their actions away from the mean preferences
of their own group, and towards their best estimate of the mean preferences of the other
group, thus adopting part of the other groups behavior.5 Second, and most importantly,
incumbent managers put less weight on their personal preferences when selecting how to
organize their divisions. This is because their own preferences are now a less reliable indica-
tor of the preferences of other managers (since these now include some managers belonging
to another group). This partially corrects the ine¢ ciencies arising from coordination ex-
ternalities. At the outset, it may appear that introducing managers from a di¤erent group
should generally decrease coordination, since their preferences are drawn from a di¤erent
distribution. We show that this intuition can be misguided once the managersreaction to a
di¤erent environment is taken into account. The surprising implication is that adding man-
agers whose preferences are uncorrelated with those of the incumbents may actually improve
coordination.
In section 5 we look at the induced preferences over the group-composition of managers
in the organization. We show that the presence of managers from another group always
imposes a cost, since incumbents now have to coordinate with managers whose preferences
are less likely to be similar to their own. However, as we have argued, it may also generate a
benet in the form of greater coordination. We characterize the su¢ cient conditions for the
net outcome of these opposing forces to induce managers to favor a diverse organization over
4The notion that within-group heterogeneity may be pervasive and substantial has been well documented,
see e.g. Inglehart (1997) and Hofstede (2001). See also Bednar et al. (2010) for a theoretical model of
within-group heterogeneity in which individuals care about coordination and consistency.
5This shares similarities with Kuran and Sandholm (2008). A tangible example of this phenomenon within
the context of social exchange is the appearance of hybrid cuisines and culinary habits in ethnically mixed
communities (think for instance of halal pizza).
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a fully homogeneous one (i.e., where all managers belong to the same group). We also show
that, in many cases, preferences exhibit decreasing returns to scale, in that incumbents
may welcome the presence of managers belonging to another group so long as their share in
the organization is su¢ ciently small, but not otherwise.6
Finally, in section 6 we augment the utility function to allow for the possibility that
managers may enjoy a direct positive externality from operating in a well-coordinated orga-
nization (as in Bolton et al. 2010, 2013), and show that this may strengthen the case for
introducing diversity in the organization. Section 7 concludes.
In addition to the works cited above, our paper contributes to several literatures. First,
it is related to the literature on the composition of teams, such as Prat (2002), Hong and
Page (2001) and Lazear (1999). With respect to these works, we present a novel rationale
for why diversity may be useful. Second, the paper also contributes to the literature on dis-
crimination. We extend existing work such as Becker (1957), Arrow (1973) and Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000, 2002, 2005), in that individual preferences over the composition of their
surroundings are derived endogenously. Finally, our approach borrows the tools of the value
of information literature such as for instance Morris and Shin (2002, 2005), Angeletos and
Pavan (2004, 2007(a) and (b)), Myatt and Wallace (2012) and Colombo et al. (2014)and
the related literature on leadership Dewan and Myatt (2008), Bolton et al. (2010, 2013) 
and applies them to a novel set of questions. Our preference-based group structure contrasts
with the information-based group structure in Cornand and Heinemann (2008). In a beauty-
contest setup where individuals receive a private and a public signal on the fundamental,
they show that introducing agents who dont have access to the public signal (e.g., because
its publicity has been curtailed) reduces coordination and may thus increase welfare. By con-
trast, we show that introducing agents whose preferences are uncorrelated with those of the
incumbents may actually improve coordination. Interestingly, the coordination-enhancing
e¤ect of diversity does not rely on the information about the other group being public. We
show that this e¤ect emerges even when each individual observes an independently drawn
private signal about the mean preferences of the other group.7
6This is reminiscent of observed attitudes towards newcomers, such as immigrants. Quillian (1995), con-
trolling for individuals factors, shows the existence of a positive correlation between population size of the
racial minority and the degree of racial prejudices expressed by natives of the country.
7See footnotes 12 and 17 below for further elaborations of this point.
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2 Model
Background and utility. An organization of measure 1 contains a continuum of divisions
each headed by a manager. Each manager, and hence each division, is represented by a
real coordinate i on the unit interval [0; 1]. Managers decide how to organize production
within their division. Each division is randomly matched with n 2 N1 other divisions in an
interacting unit that must collaborate on a task.8 The utility of a generic manager i who
selects an action ai 2 R is  U(ai   ai; ai   i), where
U(ai   ai; ai   i) =  (ai   ai)2 + (1  ) (ai   i)2 (1)
for some  2 (0; 1); ai = 1n
nP
j=1
aj is the average action of the n managers heading the
divisions with whom is division is matched and i 2 R is a taste parameter that reects is
preferences.9 This captures the idea that the costs incurred by the manager to complete the
task depend on 1) how closely he can adhere to his own preferences/expertise when organizing
production in his division and, and 2) how coordinated his division is with the other divisions
with whom it collaborates on the task. Throughout the analysis we will conne attention to
nite values of n, unless otherwise stated. A few points are worth discussing.
First, we do not allow managers to adjust their actions to suit the realized composition
of their interacting unit. Intuitively, managers cannot constantly change how their divisions
operate, but rather they must instruct their workers on a general line of conduct before they
know the identity of the divisions with whom they will collaborate on a task. This feature
is plausible also in other applications. For instance, a parent instilling values in his child
does so before the child grows up and interacts with others. Moreover, although adjusting
ones behavior to di¤erent encounters may potentially be useful, it may also be prohibitively
costly this point is also raised by Kuran and Sandholm (2008, pp.203-204).
Second, we assume that managers cannot communicate with each other before they select
their actions. This assumption is standard in the value of information literature see e.g.
8 Interacting units are composed of n equally spaced coordinates on [0; 1]. The reader may refer to the
supplementary material. Note that the composition of each interacting unit is exogenously given. This is well
suited to environments (such as for instance the workplace, as in our running example) where agents cannot
actively choose their counterparties. An obvious extension would consider endogenous assortment. We leave
the analysis of this possibility to future research.
9 In what follows, the term preferenceswill be utilized to indicate i, unless otherwise stated. Note that
our model could also accommodate alternative interpretations of i. For instance, i could capture individual
is identity or self-image, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
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Angeletos and Pavan (2007a)  and in the optimal organizational design literature  see
e.g., Prat (2002) as it allows to abstract from strategic information transmission and to
concentrate on issues purely connected with coordination. In many instances it is also a
close approximation of reality.
Last, in the model we consider the managers production cost depends only the dis-
tance between his action and his preferences and on the distance between his action and
the weighted average of the actions of others, not on the action itself. This allows us to
concentrate on e¤ects arising from coordination, and to abstract from situations where one
group has, on average, inherently superiorpreferences.
Groups. Managers are divided in two groups, A and B. The share of each group in
the population is common knowledge: the proportion of managers of group t = A;B is
equal to t, with A + B = 1. We assume that manager preferences are given by the
sum of two components: a group-specic component, equal to t + et, and an idiosyncratic
component, equal to "i. The group-specic component t + et corresponds to the sum of a
mean preference t and a random element et, common to all managers of group t. We can
think of et as capturing the e¤ect of specic circumstances on the group-specic component
of preferences, while t corresponds to mean preferences when specic circumstances are
averaged out.
To sum up, therefore, the taste parameter ti of a manager i belonging to group t is equal
to
ti = 
t + et + "i (2)
where for any group t 2 fA;Bg, t represents the mean preferences of group t, et drawn
as N (0; 1) represents the group-specic shock to preferences, with eA ? eB, and "i, the
idiosyncratic shock to preferences, is drawn as N
 
0; t

for a positive constant t, with "i ?
"j for i 6= j, where "i ? et for any i and t.10 For ease of exposition the superscript t will be
dropped from ti whenever this does not cause any ambiguity.
11
10Since our analysis focuses on the implications of information imperfections (rather than intrinsic asym-
metries between the groups) for the desirability of diversity, our case of interest is when the two groups are
symmetric, i.e. A = B . However, we will maintain the notation A and B as much as possible, in order
to separate the e¤ect of a change in the variance of the idiosyncratic shock in ones own group (respectively,
in the other group) on a managers actions and preferences for diversity.
11Moreover, note that the distribution of "i is strictly speaking a function of the group t of agent i through
its variance t. We omit the superscript t for ease of exposition.
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Information. Manager preferences are private information. Each manager observes his
own ti, but he is unable to discriminate between e
t and "i, the group-specic and the
idiosyncratic shocks a¤ecting his preferences. Formally, consider manager i belonging to
group ti = t, and a randomly drawn manager j 6= i who also belongs to group t. From is
perspective, E(tj j ti; i; xi) = t +E(et j ti; i; xi) +E("j j ti; i; xi) = t +E(et j ti; i; xi)
(since E("j j ti; i; xi) = 0). The prediction of the group-specic shock to the preferences of
group tmanagers, et, is given by the linear regression of et against all the relevant information
available to manager i (see Morris and Shin 2002 or Angeletos and Pavan 2007a). Hence,
E(et j ti; i; xi) = (i   t)=
 
t + 1

and thus, E(tj j ti; i; xi) = (tt + i)=
 
t + 1

.
We assume that all group t 2 fA;Bg managers know the value of t. However, their
beliefs over t
0
are dispersed: each manager i only receives a signal xti over it. Beliefs are
independently and identically distributed as a Normal distribution with unknown mean t
0
and variance X, xti  N(t
0
; X) for some X > 0, with xti ? xtj for i 6= j.12 This implies that,
for each manager i of group t, the best estimate of t
0
is given by his private signal xti. In
what follows, we will at time use the notation i  xti   t
0
, so that xti = 
t0 + i. For ease
of exposition the superscript t will be dropped from xti whenever this does not cause any
ambiguity. Finally, we assume that ti ? xti.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows.
t = 0 The group-specic shocks eA, eB and the individual shocks "i and i are realized.
13
t = 1 Each division manager observes i and xi and selects how to organize production
in his division.
t = 2 Divisions are randomly matched in interacting units.14
t = 3 Payo¤s are realized.
12As will become clear below, the restriction X > 0 is not instrumental to our results, all of which (except
one, i.e., proposition 6) require that X should not be too large. However, allowing for X > 0 (i) claries that
our results are not purely conned to X = 0 (i.e., the information about the other group is public) and (ii)
emphasizes that the result of proposition 6 holds independently of X, which is an interesting observation in
its own right. We thank George-Marios Angeletos for pointing this out.
13We are assuming that the same group-specic shocks a¤ect the whole manager population. Alternatively,
we could have modeled these shocks as being independently drawn within each interacting unit. This would
have not a¤ected our results.
14 In what follows, for brevity, we will at times refer to the managers with whom i is matched to mean
the managers who head the divisions that belong to the same interacting unit as is division.
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3 Homogeneous environment
We start o¤ by studying the benchmark case of an homogeneous environment, in which all
managers belong to the same group. In what follows, we accordingly drop the superscript t.
The rst step of our analysis consists in identifying the (constrained) e¢ cient decision rule,
which can then be compared to what actually happens in equilibrium.
The social planners solution. Consider the problem of a social planner, who can decide
which decision rule must be used by all managers in order to maximize their joint payo¤ (the
Decentralized Information Optimum, as in Hellwig 2005 or Angeletos and Pavan 2007a).
The social planner solves mink E[U(ai   i; ai   ai)] subject to
ai = ki + (1  k) 8i: (3)
Lemma 1. (Social planners solution.) The solution to the social planners problem is
ai = k
i + (1  k) (4)
where k  (1 )(+1)+1 (1 
n
) .
Proof: See appendix. 
Equilibrium. The equilibrium action solves minai E[U(ai   i; ai   ai) j i].
Lemma 2. (Equilibrium in homogeneous environment.) In the unique equilibrium, the ac-
tion of manager i is
ati = k
ei + (1  ke) (5)
where ke  (1 )(+1)+1  :
Proof : The proof is an adaptation of that of lemma 3 to the case t
0
= 0. 
Corollary 1. In equilibrium managers put too much weight on their personal preferences
compared with the social optimum: ke > k for all nite n.
Intuitively, the environment is characterized by coordination externalities: when choosing
their actions, managers fail to take into account that they will a¤ect the coordination costs of
other managers. From a central planners perspective, this generates too little coordination,
since managers put too much weight on their personal preferences when selecting how to
organize their divisions.
Inspection of k and ke reveals that equilibrium behavior becomes optimal only in the
limit case n!1: if interaction units are modelled as containing a continuum of divisions,
then each individual division has zero mass, and, consequently, the coordination externality
described above disappears.
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4 Equilibrium with heterogeneity
We now move away from homogeneous environments and provide a full characterization
of the equilibrium of the game. Letting ti denote is group, the equilibrium action solves
minai E[U(ai   i; ai   ai) j ti; i; xi]. This gives
ai = ai + (1  )i (6)
where ai  E(ai j ti; i; xi) is manager is expectation of the average action of the managers
with whom i is matched.
Lemma 3. (Description of equilibrium.) In the unique equilibrium, the action of manager
i of group t 2 fA;Bg is given by
ati = k
ti + 
t0xi + (1  kt   t0)t (7)
where kt  (1 )(t+1)
t+1 (1 t0 ) .
Proof: See appendix. 
Lemma 3 describes the equilibrium strategy followed by managers, as a function of the
composition of the organization. Each manager selects an action that is a weighted average
of his preferences, the mean preferences of managers of his same group (when specic cir-
cumstances are averaged out), and his forecast of the mean preferences of managers of the
other group.
Expression (7) claries the e¤ect that the presence of managers of group t0 has on the
behavior of a manager of group t. First, it induces him to move away from t and towards xi
namely, his best estimate of t
0
. Second, the presence of group t0 also a¤ects kt, namely the
weight managers of group t put on their personal preferences when deciding how to organize
production in their division. The key feature here is that, given  < 1, kt is strictly decreasing
in t
0
, the proportion of managers of group t0. Hence, the presence of managers of a di¤erent
group counteracts the ine¢ ciency identied in section 3, which takes the form of managers
putting too much weight on their personal preferences when selecting their actions.
To see why kt decreases in t
0
note that a managers expectation of the average action in
his interacting unit depends on his estimate of average preferences. It is here that the group-
composition of management within the organization makes a di¤erence. This is because the
estimate that manager i of group t can make of the preferences of a group t0 manager can only
9
be based on xi, his noisy private signal on t
0
. By contrast, when predicting the preferences
of another manager of his own group t, i is better equipped, since he knows t and he also
observes his preference parameter ti. This latter piece of information matters because, from
(2), a managers personal preferences are correlated with the preferences of others of the
same group. Hence, in equilibrium, the managers behavior depends on i for two reasons:
(i) the desire to accommodate his personal preferences, and (ii) the concern for coordination
with other managers of the same group. Clearly enough, this latter motive depends on
how widespread the managers group is within the rm. If it is very widespread, then his
interacting unit is likely to contain many other managers from that group, and, consequently,
the managers concern for coordination with others from his same group is strengthened
(and vice-versa). As a result, the weight put on i by the managers equilibrium action is a
decreasing function of t
0
, the share of managers of the other group. This observation is key
to understanding our results.
5 Induced preferences over the composition of management
in the organization
We now look at the utility a manager can expect to obtain when working in a given or-
ganization. We consider the ex-ante expectation E [U(ai   i; ai   ai) j ti; xi], computed
behind a veil of ignorance, namely, before i is realized. The idea is that, at the ex-ante
stage, a manager does not know what his exact preferences will be, since these depend on
circumstances that have yet to realize.15
Lemma 4. (A useful decomposition.) A managers ex-ante expected (indirect) utility can
be written as
 E [U(ai   i; ai   ai) j ti; xi] =   '0E[(ai   i)2 j ti; xi]  '1E[(ai   ai)2 j ti; xi] (8)
where '0  0:5 (1  ) and '1  0:5.
Proof: See appendix. 
Lemma 4 establishes that a managers expected utility can be expressed as the weighted sum
of two components, which have intuitive interpretations. Consider the rst element of (8),
namely E[(ai   i)2] (we omit the conditioning on ti; xi for brevity). Keeping everything
15Note that we let the ex-ante expectation be conditional on xi, which allows us to characterize expected
utility as a function of a managers beliefs over the other groups preferences. However, it is straightforward
to see that this plays no role for our results.
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else equal, managers dislike environments where they expect that, on average, production
will be organized in a way that di¤ers from their personal preferences. Consider now the
second element in (8), namely E[(ai   ai)2. This is the variance of ai around its conditional
mean, ai. A small value of E[(ai ai)2] implies that is expectation is a good predictor of the
actual average action in his interacting unit. In other words, manager i faces low strategic
uncertainty. Low strategic uncertainty raises expected utility, since it makes it easier to
coordinate with other divisions.
Proposition 1. (Cost of Diversity.) For a manager i of group t, E[
 
ai   i
2 j t; xi] is
always minimized at t
0
= 0.
Proof: See appendix. 
Intuitively, this follows because managers of the same type are more likely to have similar
preferences. Things can however change once we introduce the second component of (8),
namely strategic uncertainty. By lowering strategic uncertainty, the presence of managers
of a di¤erent group may well improve individual welfare. We now identify the su¢ cient
conditions for this to be the case.
Proposition 2. (Individual preferences.) Consider a manager i of group t and denote
j xi   t j as zi. There exist X 0 > 0, z0 > 0, 0 > 0 and 0 2 [0; 1) (all independent of n)
such that, when X < X 0, zi < z0, t
0   t < 0 and  2  0; 1, E[U(ai   i; ai   ai) j t; xi]
is minimized at t
0
> 0.
Proof: See appendix. 
Proposition 2 shows that diversity may actually end up lowering strategic uncertainty, and
that this e¤ect may be su¢ ciently strong to ensure that a managers expected utility is
maximized in a mixed rather than a homogeneous organization. The su¢ cient conditions for
this to occur are that zi, X and t
0 t should not be too large, and  should not be too small.
Intuitively, a large zi suggests to manager i that the mean preferences of the two groups are
very di¤erent (recall that zi j xi   t j). Keeping everything else equal, this increases
the dispersion of ai around ai, its expected value.16 Consider now t
0
. Keeping everything
else equal, a larger t
0
increases the dispersion of group t0s actions, making the behavior of
managers belonging to this group harder to predict. For a t individual, introducing group
16Consider for instance the simple case where n = 1. In that case, ai = t
0
E(at
0
j j i; xi)+(1 t
0
)E(atj j i;
xi), but ai is equal to either at
0
j (with probability 
t0) or atj (with probability 
t). If i believes that the two
groups have very di¤erent mean preferences, this clearly increases the distance between ai and at
0
j or a
t
j .
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t0 people in the organization may lower strategic uncertainty only if t0 is not too large
compared to t. Similarly, a large X also makes managers belonging to the other group
harder to predict, and thus raises strategic uncertainty. Moreover, a large X makes the
managerss predictions on group t0 more dispersed within group t; keeping everything else
equal, this makes other managers of the same group harder to predict.17 Finally, the last
condition of proposition 2 is that  should not be too small. This is because a small  lowers
the concern for coordination and therefore makes managers less responsive to changes in
organizational composition.
Although a full characterization of the idealt
0
cannot be achieved due to intractability
of the analytical expressions, a numerical illustration may be useful. Throughout the paper,
we will focus on the following example: A = B = 1,  = 0:75, n = 1 and zi = 0:25. The
numerical analysis makes clear that the benecial e¤ect of diversity may be quite sizeable.
In our example, for instance, when X = 0 a group t managers utility maximizing share of
group t0 is 9%.18
Finally, note that Proposition 2 holds for all nite n. Things would however change if we
were to consider the limit n!1.
Proposition 3. In the limiting case where n!1, E[U(ai i; ai ai) j t; xi] is minimized
at t
0
= 0.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that if equilibrium behavior in the homogeneous environment coincides
with the social planners solution (which is the case if and only if n!1), then introducing
managers of another group is never desirable for the incumbents. The desirability of diversity
is thus contingent on the existence of ine¢ ciencies in the homogenous environment.
The last proposition in this section argues that attitudes towards managers of a di¤erent
group may eventually become less welcoming as their share increases.
Proposition 4. (Decreasing returns.) Consider a manager i of group t. There exist z0 > 0
and 0 2 [0; 1) such that, when zi < z0 and  2
 
0; 1

, E[
 
ai   ai
2 j t; xi] is convex in t0.
17Note that, by modelling the signals xti and x
t
j as i.i.d., we are working against what we are set to prove.
Consider for instance an alternative scenario, where all managers within the same group t = fA;Bg receive
the same signal xt about t
0
. For a manager of group t, this would make the reaction of others of his same
group to the presence of managers of group t0 easier to predict, and would thus increase the desirability of
diversity. Indeed, it can be easily shown that, if all managers within the same group were to receive the same
signal xt, and assuming X > 0, then for any t
0
> 0 the value of E[U(ai i; ai ai) j t; xi] would be smaller
than in the case we analyze. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
18We let the reader refer to the next section (Figures 2 and 4) for a more general characterization.
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Proof: See appendix.
Intuitively, if a managers group represents a small fraction of the manager population, then
he will put little weight on his own preferences when selecting his actions since these are
poor predictors of the actions of other managers. Hence, if a small share of managers of, say,
group t0 are introduced in an organization composed predominantly of group t, they will put
little weight on their personal preferences, and instead put a lot of weight on (their estimate
of) the mean preferences of group t. From the perspective of group t, these managers are
then easy to predict and to coordinate with. However, as their share increases, managers of
group t0 start to put more weight on their personal preferences when organizing production
in their divisions. From the point of view of the other group, this makes them harder to
predict and thus decreases their appeal. Note that the su¢ cient conditions for decreasing
returns are consistent with those in Proposition 2.
6 Positive externality from a well-coordinated organization
We now allow for the possibility that managers may enjoy a direct positive externality from
working in a well-coordinated organization, as in Bolton et al. (2010, 2013). To this purpose,
we let their payo¤ depend on a third element, namely heterogeneity of actions. We consider
two variants.
First variant. Suppose that U(:) is given by
U(ai   ai; ai   i; V ar(aj)) =  (ai   ai)2 + (1  ) (ai   i)2 + V ar(aj) (9)
where V ar(aj)  E[(aj   a)2 j eA; eB] is the realized heterogeneity of behavior within the
whole organization, a  E(aj j eA; eB) represents overall average action, and  > 0. Note
that, since each division is of measure zero within the whole organization, the inclusion
of V ar(aj) leaves the equilibrium action (and, thus, the equilibrium) unchanged from that
identied in lemma 3. However, a managers preferences over organizational composition
are now di¤erent. To calculate V ar (aj), we consider a randomly drawn manager, who
may belong either to group A or to group B, and we compute the variance of his action
conditional on group shocks.19 We then derive the ex-ante expectation E[V ar(aj) j t; xi],
19Although common shocks are a source of variation from an ex ante viewpoint, from an ex post perspective
they are held xed, and hence they do not a¤ect the realized heterogeneity of actions. The fact that we
concentrate on conditional variance is however not crucial for the result.
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computed behind a veil of ignorance (i.e., before i is realized).20
Proposition 5. (Diversity and overall heterogeneity of actions.) Consider a manager i of
group t. There exist X 0 > 0, z0 > 0, 0 2 [0; 1) and 0 > 0 such that, when X < X 0, zi < z0,
t
0   t < 0 and  2 (0; 1) then E[V ar(aj) j t; xi] is minimized when t0 > 0.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that adding to a group that contains within-group heterogeneity a
second group whose preferences are uncorrelated with the preferences of each of the incum-
bents may reduce the overall heterogeneity of actions. When this occurs, the presence of
a direct positive externality from working in a well-coordinated organization increases the
desirability of diversity.21
Figure ?? depicts E[V ar(aj) j t; xi] as a function of t0 in our numerical example, for di¤erent
values of X. Figure ?? depicts the utility-maximizing share t
0
from the perspective of a
manager of group t, for di¤erent values of  (including  = 0, namely, the case considered in
the previous section) and X.22
Second variant. We now explore a second variant. Suppose that U(:) is given by
U(ai   ai; ai   i; V ar(atj)) =  (ai   ai)2 + (1  ) (ai   i)2 + V ar(atj) (10)
where V ar(atj)  E[(atj   at)2 j eA; eB] is the realized heterogeneity of actions within group
t, at  E(atj j eA; eB) represents average action in group t, and  > 0. This variant is
not particularly well-suited to our running example of production within a rm, but may
apply quite well to social exchanges, where it is easy to see that a given cultural group
may enjoy direct benets from being well coordinated. In what follows, we accordingly drop
the manager/division terminology and instead refer to individuals interacting with one
another. Since each individual is of measure zero within his whole group, the equilibrium
20The reason why we take ex-ante expectations is that V ar(aj), the realized heterogeneity of actions,
depends on the precise realizations of eA and eB .
21Note that the conditions laid out in proposition 5 are qualitatively similar to those identied in proposition
2. This is because in both cases the coordination-enhancing e¤ect of diversity is the driving force for the
result.
22Generally, the precise utility-maximizing composition of management within the organization will di¤er
between the two groups. However, this does not preclude that both groups may jointly favor diversity over
homogeneity. Consider for instance the numerical example discussed above, and suppose that  = 1 and
X < 0:15. Then it is easy to verify that managers from both groups prefer an environment in which the
share of each group is 50% to a homogeneous environment (in which all managers belong to their same
group). Straightforward calculations show that this is also true in the second variant (below), except that
the restriction on X in that case becomes X < 0:16.
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action (and, thus, the equilibrium) is una¤ected by the presence of V ar(atj).
23
Proposition 6. (Diversity and within-group heterogeneity of actions.) Introducing a few
individuals of the other group lowers within-group heterogeneity of actions at the margin:
evaluated at t
0 ! 0, V ar(atj) is strictly decreasing in t
0
for all values of X. This also holds
in the limit case where n!1.
Proof: Substituting for atj from (7), and since a
t = ktet+t
0
t
0
+(1 t0)t], we have atj 
at = kt"j+
t0j , and, hence, E[(a
t
j at)2 j eA; eB] = (kt)2t+(t
0
)2X. In the limit t
0 ! 0
the derivative of V ar(atj) w.r.t. 
t0 is equal to  2t  t + 12 (   1)2 =  1   + t3 < 0.

The impact of a larger t
0
on the heterogeneity of the actions of group t is a priori
ambiguous. On the one hand, it reduces kt. By inspection of (7), it is clear that a smaller
kt implies that actions are less a¤ected by the realizations of "i, namely the idiosyncratic
shocks to preferences. This reduces the heterogeneity of actions of group t individuals. On the
other hand, t individuals now put more weight on their private signal xi. Keeping everything
else equal, this makes their actions more dispersed. For t
0
su¢ ciently small, however, the
second e¤ect always becomes second-order and, thus, the rst e¤ect dominates. Intuitively,
this follows because the weight that individual actions put on xi is directly proportional to
the share of the other group in the population, and thus becomes negligible when this share
is su¢ ciently small. Hence, the result holds independently of the value of X, namely the
dispersion of beliefs xi on the other groups preferences. An implication of Proposition 6 is
that,
Corollary 2. Consider an individual i of group t. There exist  0 > 0 such that, when  >  0,
E[U(:) j t; xi] is minimized at t0 > 0.
Figure ?? depicts V ar(atj) as a function of 
t0 in our numerical example, for di¤erent values
of X. Figure ?? depicts the utility-maximizing share t
0
from the perspective of an individual
of group t, for di¤erent values of  and X.
7 Concluding remarks
Our analysis underscores the two-way relationship between individual behavior and environ-
ment: on the one hand, each individual shapes the environment he belongs to; on the other
23Note that, since E[(atj   at)2 j eA; eB ] is independent of eA and eB , taking ex-ante expectations (as we
did in the rst variant) is unnecessary in this case.
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hand, the type of environment an individual faces shapes the way he behaves. This latter
e¤ect ensures that adding individuals of a di¤erent group improves welfare, since it induces
the incumbents to rely less on personal preferences when selecting their actions.
There are a number of ways in which the analysis cay be advanced. One is endogenous
matching. Another is competition among rms. Our analysis suggests that by introducing
some diversity in their workforce rms may become more attractive to potential employees.
What does the equilibrium look like in that case? We leave these questions to future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. From (3), ai = kn
P
j j + (1  k). Substituting for j = + e+ "j
8j, we obtain ai =  + ke + kn
P
j "j , so that ai   ai = k"i   kn
P
j "j . Similarly, ai   i =
(k   1) (e+ "i). Substituting for these in U(ai i; ai ai) and taking expectations, we obtain
k2E[("i  1n
P
j "j)
2]+(1  ) (k 1)2E[(e+ "i)2], i.e., k2
 
1 + 1n

+(1  ) (k 1)2 (1 + ).
This is minimized at k = k. 
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof is divided in two parts. First, we characterize the linear
equilibrium of the game. Second, we show that the linear equilibrium is also the unique
equilibrium of the game. Linear equilibrium In a linear equilibrium, the actions of a generic
individual j of group  2 fA;Bg can be written as a linear combination of preferences and
beliefs, aj = kj+xj++s . Consider now ai. This is equal to 1nE(
n
j=1aj j ti; i; xi).
By linearity of expectation, 1nE(
n
j=1aj j ti; i; xi) = 1nnj=1E(aj j ti; i; xi). Since expected
actions are identity-independent, it follows that ai = E(aj j ti; i; xi) for a generic j 6= i.
Note that
E(aj j ti; i; xi) =
X
=A;B
 [kE(j j ti; i; xi)+E(xj j ti; i; xi)+E( j ti; i; xi)+s ].
(11)
Suppose now that ti = t and let and t0 = fA;Bgnt. Substituting for E(t0j j t; i; xi) =
E(t
0 j t; i; xi) = E(xtj j t; i; xi) = xi , E(xt
0
j j t; i; xi) = t and E(tj j t; i; xi) =
(tt + i)=(
t + 1) in (11) gives
E(aj j t; i; xi) = t0(kt0xi+t0t+t0xi+st0)+ (1 t0)(kt
tt + i
t + 1
+txi+
tt+st). (12)
Substituting for (12) in the rst-order condition (6) we obtain
kt = (1  t0) ktt+1 + (1  ) ; t = [t
0
(kt
0
+ t
0
) + (1  t0)t]
t = [t
0
t
0
+ (1  t0)(kt tt+1 + t)]; st = [t
0
st
0
+ (1  t0)st]
(13)
for t 2 fA;Bg. System (13) has eight equations and eight unknowns. Solving out, we
obtain (7). Uniqueness of linear equilibrium. The proof is standard but lengthy, and is
therefore relegated to the supplementary material. 
Proof of lemma 4. We have
E[U(ai   i; ai   ai) j ti; xi] = E[(ai   ai)2 j ti; xi] + (1  )E[(ai   i)2 j ti; xi]: (14)
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We now consider each element of (14) in turn. Substituting for ai from (6), we have ai i =
(ai i). Hence, E[(ai i)2 j ti; xi] = 2E[(ai i)2 j ti; xi]. Consider now the rst term
in (14). Substituting for ai from (6), we have ai   ai = ai   ai   (1  ) (ai   i). Hence,
E[(ai   ai)2 j ti; xi] = E[(ai   ai)2 j ti; xi] + (1  )2E[(ai   i)2 j ti; xi]
  2 (1  )E[(ai   i)(ai   ai) j ti; xi]:
(15)
The last term in (15) can equivalently be expressed as E(a2i j ti; xi) E(aiai j ti; xi) E(iai j
ti; xi) +E(iai j ti; xi). By iterated expectations, E(aiai j ti; xi) = E[E
 
aiai j ti; i; xi
 j ti;
xi] = E[aiE (ai j ti; i; xi) j ti; xi] = E(a2i j ti; xi) since ai = E(ai j ti; i; xi). Similarly,
E(iai j ti; xi) = E[iE(ai j ti; i; xi) j ti; xi] = E(iai j ti; xi). This proves that the last
term in (15) is equal to zero. Putting these together we obtain (8). 
In the proofs that follow, it will be convenient to use the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Consider a manager i of group t 2 fA;Bg. For given (i; xi) the managers
expectation over ai is equal to
ai = b0i + 
t0xi + (1  b0   t0)t (16)
where b0  (1  t0) (1  ) =(1   + t + t0).
Proof. From the proof of proposition 3, ai = E(aj j t; i; xi) for a generic j 6= i. From
lemma 3,
E(aj j t; i; xi) =
X
=A;B
 [kE(j j t; i; xi)+
0
E(xj j t; i; xi)+(1 k 
0
))E( j t; i; xi)]
(17)
where  0  fA;Bgn . Substituting for kt and kt0 , for E(t0j j t; i; xi) = E(t
0 j t; i; xi) =
E(xtj j t; i; xi) = xi , and for E(tj j t; i; xi) = (tt + i))=(t + 1)), we obtain (16). 
Proof of proposition 1. Substituting for ai from lemma 5 above, ai   i becomes
i (b0   1) + t0xi + (1  b0  t0)t =
 
et + "i

(b0   1) + t0(xi t) since i = t + et + "i.
It follows that E[(ai i)2 j t; xi] = (1  b0)2(1 +t) + (t0)2(xi t)2 and @E[(ai i)
2jt; xi]
@t
0 =
2[t
0
(xi   t)2 + (
t+1)2(1 )(t+t0 )
(1 +t+t0 )3 ] > 0, which proves the result. 
Proof of proposition 2. We have derived E[(ai   i)2 j t; xi] above in the proof of
proposition 1. Consider now E[
 
ai   ai
2 j t; xi]. First, note that by iterated expectations,
as in the proof of lemma 4, E[
 
ai   ai
2 j t; xi] = E(a2i j t; xi)  E(a2i j t; xi). From lemma
5 above,
E(a
2
i j t; xi) = E[(b0i + t
0
xi + (1  b0   t0)t)2 j t; xi]: (18)
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Substituting for i = t + et + "i and solving, we obtain
E(a
2
i j t; xi) = [t(1  t
0
) + xt
0
]2 + b20
 
1 + t

: (19)
Consider now E(a2i j t; xi). From the denition of ai, it is straightforward that a2i =
1
n2
nj=1a
2
j +
2
n2
nj=1l 6=jajal. As there are n(n   1)=2 cross products, taking expectations,
we obtain
E(a2i j t; xi) =
1
n

E(a2j j t; xi)  E (ajal j t; xi)

+ E (ajal j t; xi) (20)
for generic j 6= i; l 6= j; i where j; l 2 f1; 2; ::; ng. Consider rst E(a2j j t; xi). From lemma 3,
this is equal to
E(a2j j t; xi) =
X
=A;B
E[(kj + 
 0xj + (1  k   
0
) )2 j t; xi] (21)
where  0  fA;Bgn . To evaluate the expectation in (21), which is conditional on ti = t and
xi, we rst substitute for j = 
 + e + "j and then take expectations. We then further
substitute for E(t
0 j t; xi) = xi, E[(t0)2 j t; xi] = x2i + X, E[(xt
0
j )
2 j t; xi] = (t)2 + X,
E[(xtj)
2 j t; xi] = E[(xi i+j)2 j t; xi] = x2i +2X, for kt and kt
0
and nally for t = 1 t0 .
This allows to express E(a2j j t; xi) as a function of xi, t, X, t, t
0
and t
0
. Consider now
E (ajal j t; xi). This is equal to
(t
0
)2E(at
0
j a
t0
l j t; xi) + (1  t
0
)2E(atja
t
l j t; xi) + 2t
0
(1  t0)E(atjat
0
l j t; xi): (22)
We rst substitute for aj , al (from lemma 3) and for tj , 
t
l , 
t0
j , 
t0
l , k
t, kt
0
, and take
expectations. We then substitute for E(xtjx
t
l
j t; xi) = E(xtjt
0 j t; xi) = x2i +X, E(xt
0
j 
t0 j t;
xi) = E(x
t
j
t j t; xi) = E(tt0 j t; xi) = xit, E(xt0j xt
0
l j t; xi) = E(xt
0
j 
t j t; xi) = (t)2.
Solving out, we obtain E (ajal j t; xi) as a function of xi, t, X, t, t0 and t0 . Overall,
this allows to calculate E[
 
ai   ai
2 j t; xi] and, thus, E [U(:) j t; xi], as a function of these
parameters. Let T  lim
t
0!0
@(E[U(:)jt; xi])
@t
0 . Straightforward computations then allow to
derive
T =

2n
f(22   2 + 1)X + (   1)2z2i  
(1  )2
( + 1  )3g (23)
where   (t0+1)3 3(t+1)(t0+1)2+(t+1)2(3t0+t+4)  (t+1)3(t0 t+2).
Letting t
0
= t + , we obtain lim!1  = 
 
3t + (2 )(t)2 + 1 > 0 for  su¢ ciently
small. This proves the result. 
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Proof of proposition 3. Following the method outlined in the proof of proposition 2, we
can derive E [U(:) j t; xi] as a function of zi, X, t, t0 and t0 . Let Q  d(limn!1 E[U(:)jt; xi])
dt
0 .
Straightforward computation then show that
Q = t
0
fX+ (1  ) z2i +(1  )2
t
0
(t
0   t) + (t0 + 1)(2   + 2t)
(t0 + 1  t0)3(t + 1   + t0)3 (
22 1+0)g
(24)
where 2  [(t0)2 + (t + t0)(t + 3) + 3](t0)2   (t0 + 1)(2t0 + t + 3)t0 + (t0 + 1)2,
1  (t0 + 1)(t + 1)[t0(1   t0) + tt0 + 1] and 0  (t0 + 1)2(t + 1)2. Note that
0  1 > 0 and, hence, 0   1 > 0.24 Consider now 2. This is a convex function of t0 .
Evaluated at its minimum value w.r.t. t
0
, 2 > 0.25 This proves that 22   1 + 0 > 0
and, hence, that Q  0 (with strict inequality for t0 > 0). 
Proof of proposition 4. From the proof of proposition 2 we know that E[
 
ai   ai
2 j t;
xi] can be written as
1
n
[E(a2j j t; xi)  E (ajal j t; xi)] + E (ajal j t; xi)  E(a2i j t; xi). (25)
Consider rst E (ajal j ti; xi)   E(a2i j ti; xi). Using (22) and (19), it is straightforward to
see that this is equal to (t
0
)2X+(t
0
kt
0
)2+t[(1 t0)kt]2. Remark that each element of this
expression is convex in t
0
, and, thus, their sum is convex. To prove that E[
 
ai   ai
2 j t;
xi] is convex in t
0
, it is then su¢ cient to show that this holds when n = 1. This follows
since, when n = 1, the weight assigned to the expression in square brackets in (25) is largest.
When n = 1, E[
 
ai   ai
2 j t; xi] can be written as
t
0
(t
0
+ 1)(kt
0
)2 + 
 +
1  t0
t + 1

2t + t
0
+
 
t
2  
kt
2
(26)
where 
  t0 [1   2(1   t0) (1  )]X + t0(1   t0) (1  )2 z2i . The rst component is
convex in t
0
. The second derivative of the second component of (26) w.r.t. t
0
is 2 (1  )
2X   z2i (1  )

> 0 for zi su¢ ciently small. Finally, the second derivative of the third
component of (26) w.r.t. t
0
is 2 (1  )2 (
t+1)
3
(t +t0+1)4, where   (1   
t0)
 
t + 1

2 +
(2
 
t
2
+ 4t + 2)   t + 1. Note that lim!1  = t(4 t0) +t0 + 2  t2 tt0 > 0.
This proves the result. 
24More precisely, 0   1 =
 
t + 1

(t
0
+ 1)[t(1  t0) + t0(t + t0)] > 0.
25More precisely, 2 = 34
(t
0
+1)2(t+1)2
3t
0
+3t+(t
0
)2+(t)2+t
0
t+3
> 0.
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Proof of proposition 5. In order to compute E

V ar
 
aj j eA; eB
 j ti; xi, we rst de-
rive V ar
 
aj j eA; eB

and then take expectations conditional on ti and xi. Note that
V ar
 
aj j eA; eB

= E[(aj   E(aj j eA; eB))2 j eA; eB] = E(a2j j eA; eB)  

E(aj j eA; eB)
2
.
Consider rst E(a2j j eA; eB). Substituting for aj from lemma 3, substituting for j =
 + e + "j , xj = 
 0 + j and taking expectations, we obtain
E(a2j j eA; eB) =
P
=A;B;  0fA;Bgn
 [(
0
)2X + (k )2((e )2 +  )]
+B[AA +
 
1  AB]2 + A[BB +  1  BA]2: (27)
Consider now

E(aj j eA; eB)
2
. This is equal to

E(aj j eA; eB)
2
= [BE(aBj j eA; eB) + AE(aAj j eA; eB)]2: (28)
Substituting for aj from lemma 3,

E(aj j eA; eB)
2
can be written as
fABA + BAB +
X
=A;B;  0fA;Bgn

0
(1   ) + keg2: (29)
V ar
 
aj j eA; eB

is obtained by subtracting (29) from (27). After rearranging this gives
AB (   1)2  A   B2 + 2ABX + X
=A;B
 (1  )2 ( + 1)2
(    + 1)2 [(e
 )2 +  ]: (30)
It remains to compute the expectation of (30) conditional on ti = t and xi. After substituting
for E[t
0 j t; xi] = xi, E[(t0)2 j t; xi] = x2i + X, E[(e )2 j t; xi] = 1 for  = A;B, and for
t = 1  t0 we obtain E V ar  aj j eA; eB j t; xi as a function of xi, t, X, t, t0 and t0 .
Let P  lim
t
0!0
@E[V ar(aj jeA;eB)jt;xi]
@t
0 . Straightforward calculations show that
P = (   1)2 z2i +
  2 + 22 + 1X   (   1)2
(1   + t)3	 (31)
where 	  3(t0 + 1)  32(t0 + 1)(t + 1) + (t + 1)2(3t0 + t + 4)  (t + 1)3(t0   t).
Letting t
0
= t + , we obtain lim!1 	 = 7t + 9(t)2 + (4   )(t)3 + 2 > 0 for 
su¢ ciently small. This proves the result. 
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